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Abstract—A homoglyph (name spoofing) attack is a common
technique used by adversaries to obfuscate file and domain
names. This technique creates process or domain names that are
visually similar to legitimate and recognized names. For instance,
an attacker may create malware with the name svch0st.exe so that
in a visual inspection of running processes or a directory listing,
the process or file name might be mistaken as the Windows
system process svchost.exe. There has been limited published
research on detecting homoglyph attacks. Current approaches
rely on string comparison algorithms (such as Levenshtein
distance) that result in computationally heavy solutions with a
high number of false positives. In addition, there is a deficiency
in the number of publicly available datasets for reproducible
research, with most datasets focused on phishing attacks, in which
homoglyphs are not always used.
This paper presents a fundamentally different solution to this
problem using a Siamese convolutional neural network (CNN).
Rather than leveraging similarity based on character swaps
and deletions, this technique uses a learned metric on strings
rendered as images: a CNN learns features that are optimized
to detect visual similarity of the rendered strings. The trained
model is used to convert thousands of potentially targeted process
or domain names to feature vectors. These feature vectors are
indexed using randomized KD-Trees to make similarity searches
extremely fast with minimal computational processing. This
technique shows a considerable 13% to 45% improvement over
baseline techniques in terms of area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (ROC AUC). In addition, we provide both
code and data to further future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attackers have long leveraged creative attacks to
infiltrate networks. One simple attack uses homoglyphs or
name spoofing to obfuscate malicious purpose. These attacks
occur for both domain names and process names. Attackers
may use simple replacements such as 0 for o, rn for m, and
cl for d. Swaps may also include Unicode characters that look
very similar to common ASCII characters such as ł for l.
Other attacks append characters to the end of a name that
seem valid to a user such as svchost32.exe, svchost64.exe,
and svchost1.exe. The hope is that these processes or domain
names will go undetected by users and security organizations
by blending in as legitimate names.
One naive approach for discovering name spoof attacks is to
calculate the edit (Levenshtein) distance of each new process
or domain name to each member of a set of processes or
domain names to monitor. In general, edit distance measures
the number of edits (insertions, deletions, substitutions or
transpositions) to convert one string to another. A distance
less than or equal to a pre-defined threshold is flagged as a
potential spoof. In practice, this approach suffers from a poor
False Positive (FP)/False Negative (FN) tradeoff.
Another approach is to create a custom edit distance func-
tion that accounts for the visual similarity of substitutions, so
that substituting a character with a visually similar character
result in a smaller edit distance than a visually distinct char-
acter [16], [5]. As shown later in the paper, these techniques
result in only modest improvements over standard edit distance
functions. In addition, these techniques are in large part
manually crafted, making them very difficult to enumerate
and maintain, especially when considering the full Unicode
alphabet.
To overcome the shortcomings of the aforementioned meth-
ods, this paper presents a metric-learning technique based on
a Siamese convolutional neural network (CNN). A training set
{(si, s′i, yi)}ni=1 is composed of n pairs of strings consisting
of either process names or domain names, together with a
distance target (similarity label) yi. A pair of strings (si, s′i)
for which s′i is a spoof of si (or vice versa), we assign yi = 0
(similar), and yi = 1 (dissimilar) otherwise. Each string si
and its pair s′i is then rendered as a binary image xi and x
′
i,
respectively. The Siamese CNN is explicitly trained to convert
images to features vectors such that the distance between
feature vectors of spoofing pairs target a distance of 0.0, and
at least 1.0 otherwise. The model is deployed as a defensive
measure as follows. We convert all common or potentially
targeted domain or process names to feature vectors. These
feature vectors are indexed using a randomized KD-Tree
index. When a new process or domain name is observed, it
is converted to a feature vector by the CNN and searched in
the KD-Tree index to find any visually similar matches. If a
match exists, then a homoglyph attack is detected.
On the surface, this problem may seem similar to other
well studied problems. For example, there is a large body
of work that addresses the discovery of phishing attacks
[17]. Often these attacks are waged via email so as to trick
unsuspecting victims to click on malicious domain names that
appear to be benign in order to steal information. Despite some
similarities, much of the work in phishing detection is largely
not applicable to detecting homoglyph attacks. First, phishing
attacks often use domains that appear to be legitimate, but are
visually distinct from the benign domain that they are imper-
sonating. For example, an attacker may register the domain
google-weekly-updates.com. In this example, the domain is
very different from google.com and probably unlikely to be
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registered (at least not at the time of this publication!). In fact,
previous works found that the likelihood of a phishing attack
grows with increasing edit distance between the phishing
domain and the legitimate domain [17]. Second, phishing
detection can use contextual information such as appearance
of the web pages (e.g., does the content of fake-facebook.com
appear legitimate?) and whois information (i.e., registration
information related to the domain name).
There has also been a large amount of work in regards to
finding nearest string matches in other domains such as data
cleansing, spell checking, and bioinformatics [9], [27], [8].
However, those works did not consider visual similarity of
characters and do not apply to the problem at hand. Instead,
this work is largely inspired by the work in [12] that uses a
similar Siamese network used in this paper to classify digits
in the MNIST [14] and NORB [15] datasets.
Our work makes three primary contributions:
1) Presents a generic name spoofing detection technique
using a Siamese CNN, which to our knowledge, is the
first such application of metric learning to homoglyph
detection,
2) Compares the system’s efficacy to other common string
comparison techniques, and
3) Contributes source code to reproduce results in this
paper as well as two datasets to further research in this
area1.
In Section II we take a deeper dive into related work as well
as the motivations behind this work. In Section III we discuss
the high-level design of the system and the architecture of our
neural network. In Section IV we compare our neural network
to other string matching techniques. We conclude the paper in
Section V with some closing thoughts.
II. RELATED WORK
An extensive amount of work has been devoted to efficient
string matching. Some of this work is focused on making
string matching fast [8], [9] while other work focuses on
improving the quality of nearest neighbor searches [27].
However, conventional string matching algorithms are not an
effective technique for detecting name spoofing. For example,
consider the windows application iexplore.exe. A malicious
user may create a piece of malware with the name iexp1orc.exe
that is an edit distance of 2 from the original executable. In
this case, a system that labels all process names with an edit
distance of 2 or less would catch this spoof attack. However,
consider also the common windows process explorer.exe. This
process is also an edit distance 2 from iexplore.exe resulting
in a false positive.
The key to detecting name spoofing attacks is to make
visual comparisons. When visually comparing the three strings
iexplore.exe, iexp1orc.exe, and explorer.exe, one of the strings
looks very different from the other two. The first and last
character (before .exe) of the string explorer.exe has a different
1https://github.com/endgameinc/homoglylph
shape from the other two strings making it very distinguish-
able. Such distinguishable characters are unlikely to fool
anyone in a spoofing attack, but are lost in basic string
matching systems.
There are many subtle string updates that result in a string
that appears almost identical to the original string. In addition,
the Windows operating system supports Unicode characters
resulting in an exponentially large number of string swaps
making signature-based detection infeasible (i.e., a lookup ta-
ble of all possible character swaps). Several spoofing attempts
are given in Table I. Notice how easily spoofing strings may
be overlooked. Authors in [25] give more in-depth analysis of
characteristics that make strings appear visually similar.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF PROCESS NAME HOMOGLYPHS
Original Spoof Edit Distance
SVCHOST.EXE SVCH0ST.EXE 1
LSASS.EXE LS4SS.EXE 1
iexplore.exe iexp1orc.exe 2
chtime.exe chtirne.exe 2
Authors in [5], [16] attempted to improve upon conventional
edit distance functions by adding knowledge of visual likeness
in characters. For example, swapping a r for a n would result
in a smaller distance than a y or a b. This technique relied on
a largely manual step of deriving similarity measures between
characters and did not include the massive unicode set. While
this method generally improves upon conventional techniques,
it still exhibits a high false positive rate.
A. Phishing
Phishing attacks can be broken down into four categories
[10]:
1) Obfuscating a domain name with an IP address,
2) Obfuscating a domain name with another domain name,
3) Obfuscating a domain name within a longer domain
name, and
4) Obfuscating a domain name using misspellings and
common typos.
Examples of each type of phishing attack is given in Table
II. The first three obfuscation techniques result in domains that
are not visually similar. While the target domain name may be
a substring of the phishing domain name, the two strings are
visually different. The fourth obfuscation technique may seem
to be similar to process name spoofing, however, misspellings
and typos are not necessarily visually similar.
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF URL PHISHING ATTACKS. ONLY THE LAST IS A
HOMOGLYPH.
Type Phish URL Target Domain
1 202.0.0.1/google.com google.com
2 badDomain.com/google.com google.com
3 google.com.badDomain.com google.com
4 google.om google.com
Machine learning based approaches for detecting phishing
domains rely on two types of features [10], [30], [3], [29],
[19]. These include domain-based features that are derived
directly from the domain name and page-based features that
are derived from the hosted page.
These techniques have been effective in phishing detection,
however, they do not focus on visual similarity. In fact, authors
in [17] found that the likelihood of a phishing attack grows
with increasing edit distance between the phishing domain
and the legitimate domain. Thus, methods to detect phishing
attacks are largely not applicable to detecting spoofing attacks.
While a new set of features could be derived to detect name
spoofing, this process is extremely time consuming and highly
susceptible to the cat and mouse games waged by adversarial
actors. For these reasons, this work focused solely on visual
appearance and relies on convolutional neural networks to
derive its own visual features.
B. Siamese Neural Networks
Siamese neural networks were first introduced in 1993 by
Bromely and LeCun as a method to validate handwritten
signatures [6]. At its core, a Siamese neural network is simply
a pair of identical neural networks (i.e., shared weights) which
accept distinct inputs, but whose outputs are merged by a
simple comparative energy function. The key purpose of the
neural network is to map a high-dimensional input (e.g., an
image) into a target space, such that a simple comparison
of the targets by the energy function approximates a more
difficult-to-define “semantic” comparison in the input space.
Mathematically, if a neural network gW : Rn 7→ Rd is
parameterized by weights W, and we choose simple Euclidean
distance for our comparative energy function E : Rd ×Rd 7→
R, then the Siamese network computes dissimilarity between
the pair of images (x1,x2) simply as
dW (x1,x2) = E (gW (x1) , gW (x2))
= ||gW (x1)− gW (x2) ||2. (1)
Note that gW represents a family of functions parameterized
by W. We wish to learn W such that dW (x1,x2) is small
if x1 and x2 are similar, and large if they are dissimilar.
At first glance, one may be tempted to choose W simply
minimizing dW over pairs of similar inputs; however, this
may lead to degenerate solutions such as gW = constant,
for which dW is identically zero. Instead, previous research
has employed contrastive loss to ensure that similar inputs
result in small dW, while simultaneously pushing dW to be
large for dissimilar inputs [7].
Chopra et al. [12] proposed a contrastive loss function of
the form
L (W) =
P∑
i=1
(1− yi)LS
(
diW
)
+ yiLD
(
diW
)
, (2)
where yi = 0 if the images in the ith input pair (x1,x2)
i
are deemed similar and yi = 1 if dissimilar, diW =
dW
(
(x1,x2)
i
)
is the Siamese network dissimilarity for the
ith pair, and the summation occurs over all P input pairs.
The authors chose partial loss for similar pairs to be squared
loss, LS(x) = x2, while partial loss for dissimilar pairs
was chosen to be the squared hinge loss with margin α,
LD(x) = (max {0, α− x})2. Intuitively, this loss aims to
shrink the distance between feature vectors of similar pairs
to 0, while expanding the distance between dissimilar pairs to
be at least α. In our experiments, we use a margin of α = 1.
Since the loss function is differentiable with respect to W,
the weights can learned via backpropagation. Notable is the
fact that after the weights W have been trained, the network
gW may be used in isolation to map from the space of images
to the compact target feature space for simple comparison.
C. Indexing Strings
Once a Siamese neural network is trained to convert strings
to a feature vector, we must select many process names (or
domain names) that we are interested in monitoring (i.e.,
which names do we expect to be targeted in a spoof attack?).
This list is tractable as it is less likely for an attacker to
spoof a process (or domain) name that is known by very few
people. However, this list can easily grow into the hundreds
of thousands. For example, someone interested in monitoring
domain names may want to monitor the top 250K common
domains around the world. A naive approach is to compute the
Euclidean distance between a suspect string’s feature vector
and every string’s feature vector that is being monitored. This
brute force nearest search can be improved significantly using
indexing.
We employ (randomized) KD-Trees as a geometrical index
[4] to quickly search for similar feature vectors. There are
several algorithms for performing nearest neighbor search
[13], [11], [28], [22], and many may work for this technique.
KD-Trees were chosen for their simplicity and availability of
open source tools.
In KD-Trees, the dataset is bisected at the median point
along the dimension of highest variance, forming two geo-
metric axis-aligned child regions, which are subsequently split
using the same logic, and so on, to form a deterministic tree.
For search, deterministic trees may scale poorly with dimen-
sionality. Several randomization techniques may be applied
to the former strategy, which results in a non-deterministic
tree. We use a standard implementation of FLANN [21], in
which the split point at each level is chosen randomly among
those dimensions that exhibit the greatest variance. A constant
number of trees (we use 10 trees in experiments) are built
using independent random choices of the split dimension, and
all trees are searched for each query.
III. METHOD
We utilize a Siamese network as a key component for
predicting the visual similarity between a query string and
a whitelist of potential strings that an attacker may spoof. Our
process includes the following steps for determining whether
a query is a possible domain or process name spoof.
Fig. 1. Neural network trained to produce similarity features from image-
rendered string queries
Fig. 2. Overview example of training the Siamese Neural network. google.com
and gooogle.com are spoofing pairs and the CNN is trained such that the
euclidean distance between their respective features is 0.0.
1) A query string is rendered as a binary image to cap-
ture its visual representation. Independent of the query,
whitelist strings are rendered into images of fixed size
using a common font.
2) From the rendered image, image features are extracted
using a neural network, shown in Fig. 1. This network
was trained in a Siamese architecture to capture visual
similarity between image-rendered strings and possible
spoofs. The resulting features are those learned by
the Siamese network to best capture image similarity
between rendered strings and synthesized spoofs.
3) We query a randomized KD-Tree index for feature vec-
tors with Euclidean distance below a specified threshold
to the query feature, and report strings corresponding
that correspond to spoofs.
In what follows, we provide additional details about com-
ponents of this process.
A. Neural network similarity model
The neural network in Fig. 1 is intended to produce a feature
vector from an input image of rendered text. In our model, we
Fig. 3. Construction of the index takes in many domain (or process) names
that are converted to images that are converted to feature vectors by the CNN.
These feature vectors are indexed using KD-Trees. A potentially malicious
name is converted to an image and feature vectors in the same way and used
as a query into the KD-Tree index. Close matches are flagged as spoofing
attacks.
render images of size 150x12 with white text on black back-
ground using Arial TrueType font. In our experiments, the
image size accommodates horizontal space for 25 characters—
an artificial limitation that is trivially extended without other
dependent changes in the process.
With well-structured input, our network can be relatively
small. We choose two convolution layers with leaky ReLU
activations [18], each followed by maxpooling with downsam-
pling. The convolutional layers are followed by a single dense
layer that maps the flattened output of the convolutional layers
to a 32-dimensional feature vector.
Training the network is using a Siamese architecture in the
normal way: a pair of input images (x1,x2) is compared via
Euclidean distance in (1) as dW (x1,x2), and are penalized via
contrastive loss in (2). Parameters of the network are updated
via backpropagation. In our experiments, we use the RMSProp
optimizer on batches of 8 images. An example of the entire
Siamese CNN is given in Figure 2.
B. KD-Tree Index
Potential targets of spoofing attacks are converted to features
vectors with the CNN described above. These feature vectors
are indexed using ten randomized KD-Trees, where each tree
is grown to purity (1 sample per leaf node). We perform 128
checks on each query unless otherwise specified. The KD-Tree
implementation in [20] is used for experiments in this paper.
Figure 3 demonstrates how a KD-Tree index is constructed
and queried.
IV. RESULTS
All experiments are run on two datasets. The first dataset
is constructed using the National Software Reference Library
(NSRL) [1] using all files with the .exe and .dll and a filename
of at least four characters (not including the extension. Benign
pairs (i.e., not spoofing attacks) are created by calculating an
all-to-all edit distance and retaining all pairs such that:
d(x1, x2) ≤ 3, (3)
where d is the edit distance function (Levenshtein distance).
The edit distance of three is fairly small and chosen to make
the dataset one that distinguishes visual similarity from edit
distance similarity. This data sets helps highlight the short-
comings of various algorithms. Malicious pairs (i.e., spoofing
attacks) are created by generating spoofing attacks using the
file names extracted from NSRL. Spoofing attacks are gener-
ated using thousands of character swaps using both ASCII and
unicode characters. The second data set is composed similar
to the NSRL data set except that it was generated using 100K
active web domains. The restriction on edit distance (d ≤ 3)
was removed when generating the domain data set. This was
due to a lack of non-spoofing pairs with distance less than
four.
Note that benign strings in both data sets are predominantly
composed of ASCII characters. However, this would not be the
case when deploying the system in many non-English speaking
countries. For this reason, any work using this dataset should
not use the presence of unicode as an indicator of spoofing
attacks.
A. Setup
For both data sets, we randomly partition the data into
training, testing and validation sets. A separate neural network
was trained for each data set. The validation set is used during
training to prevent over-fitting. Efficacy results are calculated
using Area Under the Curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC).
For comparison, the Siamese neural network is compared
to two string matching techniques: conventional edit distance
and visual edit distance [16], [5].
B. Distance Measure Effectiveness
The first set of experiments compare the effectiveness of
the proposed technique to that of conventional edit distance
and visual edit distance [16], [5], which we re-implement
from descriptions for comparison. Figure 4 shows the ROC
for the process name data set. Standard edit distance has an
ROC very close to 0.5 (chance). This is expected as all non-
spoofing and spoofing pairs had an edit distance not exceeding
3, making it difficult to do significantly better than chance
using edit distance alone. Surprisingly, visual edit distance is
only slightly improved over edit distance. Lack of improve-
ments highlights the difficulty of manually curating distance
measures. The number of possible characters is extremely
large when including unicode and manually deriving all to
all distances from each character is unfeasible. One could
attempt to learn an all to all distance between characters,
but manually creating such a data set to learn on is also
prohibitively expensive.
Figure 5 shows the ROC curve for the domain data set. Note
that all three methods perform far better than the process name
data set due to non-spoofing pairs having edit distances that
are greater than 3. However, the CNN performs significantly
better than the other two techniques. As expected, the visual
edit distance is improved over the standard edit distance.
C. KDTree Performance
The second set of experiments measures the speed improve-
ments and recall degradation when using a KDTrees to index
features derived from our model. The KDTree is used to index
Fig. 4. ROC curves for classifying process name spoof attacks
Fig. 5. ROC curves for classifying domain name spoof attacks
known strings that may be spoofed. For example, the top
100K most visited domains can be converted to feature vectors
using the model and indexed as possible targets for homoglyph
attacks. When a new domain is seen, it is converted to a feature
vector using the model and is compared to everything in our
index. A naive linear scan will take nd computations where n
is the number of elements in our index and d is the number
of dimensions. On the other hand, a KDTree index will only
take c × (log (n) + d) where c is the number of checks used
by the KDTree. (The number of checks is the number of leaf
nodes visited in the search.) We use c = 128, and in practice
c is typically on the order of 64 to 256 making a KDTree far
faster than a naive linear scan for large data sizes. However,
this speed increase comes at a cost of lower recall.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 displays the tradeoff between speed
and recall with increasing number of checks for the process
data and domain data respectively. This experiment is run on
50,000 indexed elements and 50,000 queries. The number of
checks equates to the number of leaves explored in a search for
the nearest neighbor. The closest element in each explored leaf
is returned as the nearest neighbor. The likelihood of finding
the true nearest neighbor increases with the number of leaves
explored. However, the time it takes to search also increases.
There is one main differences between the performance of
Fig. 6. Displays the tradeoff of speed and recall with varying number of
checks.
Fig. 7. Displays the tradeoff of speed and recall with varying number of
checks.
the two data sets. The domain data set achieves near 1.0
recall while the process data set achieves near 0.95 recall.
One cause of degradation in the process name data set are
clusters of very similar process names. For example, some
files in the NSRL data set have versioning information in
their file names (e.g., firefox-1.5.0.1.tar and firefox-2.0.0.1.tar).
Each element in these clusters will have very similar feature
vectors generated by the CNN making it more likely for
a KD-Tree to return incorrect results. Figure 8 shows the
distribution of distances from each process/domain name to
its nearest neighbor. Distances are calculated using the edit
distance normalized by the string length.
As can be seen in Figure 8, process names have a much
larger percentage of nearest neighbors falling in the sub 10%
range than the domain dataset. This distribution of data can
degrade performance as seen in Figure 6.
Both datasets produce nearly identical runtime behavior, and
get the best recall/time trade-off with 128 checks. The number
of checks was based on 50,000 elements and is expected to
increase with the number of elements in the index.
D. Visualizing nearest neighbors
Figure 9 displays the feature vectors of twenty domain
names, consisting of 4 domain names each with 4 additional
homoglyphs. A PCA projection is performed on these feature
vectors to reduce the number of dimensions to two. The
names consist of google.com, facebook.com, twitter.com, and
Fig. 8. Displays the distribution of distances from each process/domain name
to its nearest neighbor. Distance is defined as the percentage edit distance (i.e.,
the edit distance normalized by the string length).
Fig. 9. (top) Two dimensional PCA projection of feature vectors derived
from google.com, facebook.com, twitter.com, and snapchat.com along with 4
homoglyph attacks; (bottom) homoglyphs for each of the domain names.
snapchat.com along with four homoglyph attacks for each
domain. Note how each domain and respective homoglyph
attacks cluster tightly demonstrating that our learned feature
vectors are able to distinguish well between domain names.
Distinguishability allows us to predict spoofing attacks with
very low false positive rates.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a technique2 for detecting domain and process
homoglyph attacks using a Siamese CNN. Names are con-
verted to images and passed to the CNN to convert the name
to a feature vector. The CNN is trained such that similar strings
(i.e., spoofing attacks) generate feature vectors that have a
small Euclidean distance while dissimilar strings produce
feature vectors that have a large Euclidean distance. Results
were compared to conventional detection methods using edit
distance and demonstrated a 13% to 45% improvement in
terms of area under the ROC curve.
2Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/endgameinc/
homoglylph.
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